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EQUAL TREATMENT IS NOT ESTABLISHMENT
EUGENE VOLOKHI*
Does the Constitution require discrimination against reli-
gious schools and against parents who choose them?
This question is the heart of the Establishment Clause
debate over school choice. May the government treat govern-
ment-run schools, secular private schools, and religious schools
equally, supporting children's education regardless of the religi-
osity of the school to which the children go? Or must the gov-
ernment exclude religious schools from this generally available
benefit?
Casting the matter in terms of discrimination frames the
issue in a stark light, but such a characterization is accurate: Dis-
crimination is indeed what it's all about. Fair-minded people
may argue that the Constitution does require such discrimina-
tion; not all discrimination is bad. But there should be no deny-
ing that a constitutional rule excluding religious schools from
generally available benefits rests on the theory that discrimina-
tion is constitutionally mandated.
* Acting Professor, UCLA Law School (volokh@law.ucla.edu). Some
parts of this article are adapted from Eugene Volokh, Vouched For, THE NEW
REPUBLIC, July 6, 1998, at 12. Many thanks to Clint Bolick, Rick Duncan, Rick
Garnett, BradJacob, Chip Lupu, Michael McConnell, and Stephen Monsma for
their suggestions.
This article is built on a large body of scholarship by those who have
worked in this field much longer and more deeply than I have; I cannot give
pinpoint cites to each piece precisely because my thinking has been so
permeated by theirs. Some particularly good examples (though ones with
which I may differ on some particulars) are: Douglas Laycock, The Underlying
Unity of Separation and Neutrality, 46 EMORY L.J. 43 (1997); Philip Kurland, Of
Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. CHI. L. REv. 1 (1961); Michael
McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 115, 183-87
(1992); Mark Tushnet, "Of Church and State and the Supreme Court": Kurland
Revisited, 1989 Sup. CT. REv. 373.
My aim here is more to summarize and elaborate on the existing
arguments in favor of the constitutionality of school choice, not to break any
new theoretical ground; Part E, though, should be relatively novel, as should
some of the material in Parts B.2-D.
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A. "No MONEY FLOW" VERSUS EQUAL TREATMENT
1. No Money Flow
The chief argument for a constitutional rule of mandatory
discrimination against religious schools has been the "no money
flow" theory. The Constitution, the argument goes, does require
that religious schools and institutions be excluded from even-
handed, generally available funding programs, because it's
wrong for taxpayer money to indirectly flow to religious teaching.
In the words of Kathleen Sullivan, "the establishment clause
necessarily requires that government 'disfavor' religion in rela-
tion to secular programs," because "government [may not] make
us pay taxes to be used for religious indoctrination in faiths we
may not share."1  Or, as the ACLU argued, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court's upholding an evenhanded school choice pro-
gram should be condemned because under it "Wisconsin taxpay-
ers will be coerced into supporting religions, including sects and
cults, with which they may not agree. "2
But is there really something wrong with tax money flowing,
through private choices made under neutral funding programs,
to religious institutions? Consider four ways in which this can
happen:
1. The government takes our taxes and gives college stu-
dents GI Bill funds, Pell grants, and vocational education funds
for the handicapped, usable at any accredited college, whether
religious or not (even one run by, horror of horrors, a "sect" or
"cult"). A student uses this money for pervasively religious edu-
cation, for instance studying theology at Notre Dame, or even
studying to be a minister at a seminary.
3
2. The government takes our taxes and gives them out as
government salaries or as welfare. An employee or welfare recip-
ient contributes some of this money to a church or synagogue,
for purposes of religious teaching and ritual or for the perva-
sively religious education of his children.
3. The government exempts charitable contributions from
the income tax, thus in effect subsidizing charitable spending,
whether religious or not. As the Supreme Court has held, "Every
1. Kathleen Sullivan, Debate with Michael McConnell, SLATE (Dec. 18, 1998)
<http://www.slate.com/dialogues/98-12-09/dialogues.asp?iMsg=2> and (Dec.
30, 1998) <http://www.slate.com/dialogues/98-12-09/dialogues.asp?iMsg4>.
2. ACLU Says Wisconsin Ruling on Vouchers Leaves Students With No Choice for
Religious Liberty (June 10, 1998) <http://www.aclu.org/news/n061098a.html>.
3. See Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481
(1986) (holding that the Establishment Clause wasn't violated by a person using
vocational education funds for the blind to study to be a minister).
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tax exemption constitutes a subsidy that affects nonqualifying
taxpayers, forcing them to become indirect and vicarious
donors."4 A taxpayer routes some of this subsidy-which ulti-
mately comes out of your and my taxes-to a church, for pur-
poses of general religious teaching and ritual, or even to a
specific fund for the pervasively religious education of others'
children.
4. The government takes our taxes and gives parents educa-
tion vouchers usable at any accredited school, whether religious
or not. A parent takes this money and uses it for the pervasively
religious education of his children.
All four examples are structurally identical: Money flows
from taxpayers to the government to recipients of government
funds, and then, because of the recipients' individual choices, to
a religious use. If the "no money flow" theory is right, then all
these examples are unconstitutional. The GI Bill and Pell grant
programs must discriminate against religious colleges. Welfare
recipients or government employees must be barred from donat-
ing any of their income to churches or from spending it on their
children's religious educations. The tax system must discriminate
against religious charitable contributions. But surely this can't
be so.
Surely the first three examples show us that there's nothing
wrong in tax money flowing to religious uses as such (though
there may be something wrong in tax money flowing to religious
uses under a government program that discriminates in favor of
such uses). And if that's true, then the no-money-flow argument
against K-12 school choice collapses.
But wait, some say, surely these examples are different. But
how are they different? It's not enough to just fit them into a
different mental box, for instance the "bulk payment" box rather
4. Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 14 (1989) (plurality)
(saying this in the Establishment Clause context); id. at 28 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (describing a tax exemption for religious
publications as "preferential support for the communication of religious
messages," which suggests that tax exemptions generally are "support" for the
exempted material, whether preferential or not); see also Bob Jones Univ. v.
United States, 461 U.S. 574, 591 (1983) (in the Free Exercise Clause context)
("When the Government grants exemptions or allows deductions all taxpayers
are affected; the very fact of the exemption or deduction for the donor means
that other taxpayers can be said to be indirect and vicarious 'donors.'"); Regan
v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 544 (1983) (in the Free Speech
Clause context) ("Both tax exemptions and tax deductibility are a form of
subsidy that is administered through the tax system. . . . Deductible
contributions are similar [though not identical] to cash grants of the amount of
a portion of the individual's contributions.").
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than the "school choice" box, or the "tax deduction" box rather
than the "subsidy" box. One must point to some difference that
explains why one form of money flow to religion is permissible
and another is not.
And I can see no such differences. The no-money-flow argu-
ment can't, for instance, distinguish higher education (as in the
GI Bill or Pell grants) from K-12 education, because the theory at
the core of the no-money-flow argument-the notion that my
money shouldn't indirectly flow to religious uses of which I disap-
prove-is completely unrelated to any such distinction. Both,
after all, can involve tax money indirectly flowing to "pervasively
sectarian" religious teaching. What's more pervasively sectarian
than a seminary education, the very sort of education that the
Supreme Court unanimously said may be funded with even-
handed, generally available funds for education for the blind?5
Likewise, the no-money-flow argument can't distinguish
school choice funds from government salaries or welfare pay-
ments contributed to religious uses on the grounds that special-
purpose vouchers are somehow different from general-purpose
payments. Both involve money indirectly flowing from taxpayers
through recipients of government funds to religious institutions.
Both involve private choices uninfluenced by any government
preference for religion. If money may flow to religious uses
through donations by government workers or welfare recipients,
this can only be because tax money may flow to others' religious
uses, so long as it gets there without any government preference
for religion.
Similarly, the no-money-flow argument can't distinguish
"bargained-for" funds, such as government salaries,6 from
5. See Witters, 474 U.S. 481 (unanimously upholding such a program). I
have heard some try to distinguish the two on the grounds that K-12 education
involves "indoctrination" of impressionable children, while college education
involves an adult audience; but this can only be relevant when the question is
whether the audience is coerced by government speech. See Lee v. Weisman,
505 U.S. 577, 593 (1992) (striking down graduation prayers at government-run
high school as unduly coercive "for a dissenter of high school age" but reserving
judgment as to whether such prayers would be permissible "if the affected
citizens are mature adults"); Tanford v. Brand, 104 F.3d 982 (7th Cir. 1997)
(upholding graduation prayers at government-run university, partly on the
grounds that the audience consists of "mature attendees"). When the students
are present by their own choice or by the choice of their legal guardians, the
inquiry can't focus on whether they are being coerced by the religious
instruction, but only on whether the indirect spending of taxpayer money on
this instruction violates the taxpayers' rights. And this inquiry is exactly the
same whether the students are children or adults.
6. Some have argued that the GI Bill, like government funds, is also
bargained-for compensation, in a sense part of the soldiers' salary, but this isn't
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"unearned" school choice funds. Again, both involve the "gov-
ernment... mak[ing] us pay taxes" that are then indirectly "used
for religious indoctrination in faiths we may not share." Whether
the taxes flow as a result of a quid pro quo for services ("We'll
pay your salary if you work for us") or as a result of a long-term
investment in future services ("We'll pay for your education
because we think this will make you a more productive member
of society"), the money still indirectly flows to religion.
But even if I'm wrong as to one or another of these exam-
ples, my general argument requires only that at least one of the
examples work. If any of the examples involves the same sort of
indirect money flow to religion as does school choice, then
school choice should be just as constitutional as the program
involved in that example.
2. Equal Treatment
The no-money-flow theory seems unappealing in most of
these examples for a simple reason: Equality rings truer to our
notions of the government's proper role with regard to religion
than does discrimination. The Constitution bars the "establish-
ment of religion," and treating everyone the same without regard
to religion is hard to see as "establishing" anything-except
equality.
I believe that government preferences for religion, whether
in the form of special benefits going to one religion or to all
religions, or government speech endorsing one religion or all
religions, are generally unconstitutional. But equal treatment of
religious and nonreligious people and institutions is perfectly
fine, and such equal treatment maintains the separation of
church and state by keeping the government scrupulously sepa-
rate from people's decisions about religion: The government
facilitates a particular sort of behavior (whether it be university
education, charitable giving, or K-12 education) without any con-
cern about whether the behavior is religious or not. To borrow a
phrase from Justice O'Connor, the government is not in any way
"mak[ing] adherence to a religion relevant to a person's stand-
ing in the political community."7
historically accurate. The Bill was enacted as the Servicemen's Readjustment
Act of 1944, and thus wasn't part of the originally promised salary for most
World War II veterans. See 38 U.S.C. § 101 hist. note prec. (1998).
7. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 69 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring in
the judgment); see also Board of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 715 (1994)
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Lee, 505
U.S. at 606 (Blackmun, J., concurring); id. at 626 (Souter, J., concurring);
County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 626 (1989) (O'Connor, J.,
1999]
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Equal treatment thus fits most people's intuitive responses
to the first three hypotheticals I gave above. It's consistent with
the notion of separation of church and state, a concept that,
properly understood, is a sound restatement of the obligation
not to "establish" religion by giving it any special status. It fits the
constitutional text. As I will explain in Part C.1, it isn't contra-
dicted by any evidence we have of original intent. As I will
explain in Part E, it's consistent with basic Free Speech Clause
and Free Exercise Clause principles.
It also makes moral sense, because it fits with the generally
accepted notion that the government may not discriminate
against people because of their religious affiliation (or lack of it).
People who want to send their children to religious schools are
no less worthy than people who want to send their children to
private secular schools or government-run schools. The religious
schools, like the other schools, are providing the socially valuable
service of educating children, and are generally doing it no worse
than the government-run schools.
The religious schools do teach a religious value system-just
as secular schools teach a secular value system. There's nothing
wrong from a constitutional perspective with either sort of value
system, and there's no reason why the government is obligated to
discriminate against one or the other system, and thus against
the parents who choose to teach their children one or the other
system. Just as we wouldn't tolerate discrimination against atheis-
tic schools, or discrimination against secular schools, so we
shouldn't assume that the Constitution requires discrimination
against religious schools.
As I mentioned above, I oppose preference for religion as
much as I do discrimination against religion. The government
may neither give special preferences to religious schools nor
teach a religion itself by adopting a religious curriculum or
school prayers, because that would be governmental discrimina-
tion in favor of religion generally or even some religions in par-
ticular.8 But the government giving parents funds that they can
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Texas Monthly, Inc., 489
U.S. at 9 n.1 (plurality).
8. I recognize that this sometimes puts the government in a bind: The
government can't teach religion in its schools, since that would be
discrimination in favor of religion (and probably in favor of one religion or one
set of religions); and it can't completely exclude religion from its schools, since
that would be discrimination against religion. In theory, the government
should expose children both to religious and nonreligious answers to various
contested questions, with no preference for either, much as we hope that a
comparative philosophy class or an art history class would expose students to a
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then use to teach their children whatever values the parents
choose is not preference for religion-it's equal treatment with-
out regard to religion.
We see echoes of this egalitarian understanding even among
those who most prominently espoused variants of the no-money-
flow theory. Justice Brennan, for instance, captured this view
well when he said, in striking down a law that banned clergy from
public office, that "government may not use religion as a basis of
classification for the imposition of duties, penalties, privileges or
benefits." Such "discriminat[ion] between religion and nonreli-
gion," Brennan (joined by Justice Marshall) wrote, "manifests
patent hostility toward, not neutrality respecting, religion." "The
Establishment Clause does not license government to treat reli-
gion and those who teach or practice it, simply by virtue of their
status as such, as subversive of American ideals and therefore sub-
ject to unique disabilities."9
The Constitution, if this view is taken seriously, requires-
and certainly allows-equal treatment of religion, not discrimi-
nation against it. And evenhanded school choice programs that
let parents choose any school, government-run, private secular,
or religious, are thus constitutional.
B. THE DEFENSE OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST RELIGION-
THREE EQUALITY ARGUMENTS
Once the no-money-flow argument is rejected-as it must
be-how do supporters of discrimination against religious
schools defend their position? Let me begin with three argu-
ments that at least speak the language of equality.
1. The Predominant Effect Argument
Equality is well and good, some say, and money flow as such
isn't the problem, but aren't school choice programs unequal in
effect? Most of their funds, the argument goes, end up being
spent at religious schools. The programs, even if facially neutral,
broad range of ideas and works, religious and secular. But in practice,
government-run institutions invariably end up either tilting too much in favor
of religion or too much against it. This is yet another advantage of a school
choice system, because a general government-funded choice system can treat
religions and nonreligious belief systems evenhandedly, by letting parents
choose the value system that their children will be taught, rather than having
the government make that choice.
9. McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 641 (1978) (Brennan,J., concurring in
the judgment); see also id. at 636, 639.
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thus have a disparate impact, which should doom them even
under an equality theory.
As it happens, though, only 9% of American K-12 students
go to religious schools. The claim that "most school choice
funds will end up flowing to religious schools" is plausible only if
one puts on blinders that exclude the number one beneficiary of
school spending: government-run schools, which teach 89% out
of the remaining 91%.1"
Of course, it's easy to put on these blinders, because it's
always easy to view the status quo-and the disparate impacts that
it contains-as somehow necessarily right, and to view shifts from
the status quo as inherently suspect. But the Constitution
doesn't command such a narrow view of the world. Right now,
all standard K-12 spending goes to secular education; this itself is
a powerful "disparate impact" favoring secular uses and disfavor-
ing religious uses. School choice will diminish this disparate
impact.
For the reasons the Court has given in the Equal Protection
Clause context,11 I think disparate impact inquiries are flawed,
and shouldn't be part of the constitutional analysis. But those
who do care about disparate impact should look to the impact of
educational spending generally-not of the small minority of
educational spending that would go to private schools under
school choice-and recognize that school choice causes less dis-
parate impact based on religiosity than does the current system.
2. The Disparate Impact on Various Religions Argument
What about the possible disparate impact on particular reli-
gions? Not all religions, the argument runs, can equally benefit
from school choice programs. Some small religious groups-for
instance, the only Jewish family in a small town-won't be large
enough to set up their own schools; and because of their reli-
gious beliefs, they won't be able to take advantage of the other
religious schools that spring up. Even if the schools don't overtly
require the students to profess a certain faith (many Catholic
10. See NATIONAL CTR. FOR EDUC. STATS., 1997 DIGEST OF EDUCATION
STATISTICS tbls. 40 & 59 (1998), available at (visited Feb. 12, 1999) <http://nces.
ed.gov/pubs/digest97/d97t040.html> and <http://nces.ed.gov/pubs/
digest97/d97t059.html>. The numbers I used were the ones for Fall 1993
(government-run schools, table 40) and 1993-94 (private schools, table 59).
During that time, there were 43,464,916 children enrolled in government-run
schools, 768,451 in private secular schools, and 4,202,194 in private religious
schools. See id.
11. See Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979); Washington v.
Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
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schools, for instance, happily accept non-Catholic students), we
can understand that many groups can't really derive a benefit
from schools which teach a curriculum with which the groups
disagree in an environment that's built around principles with
which they disagree.' 2
But again, such a disparate impact is even more present
under the current system. People of various religious groups
have beliefs that keep them from taking advantage of the govern-
ment-run schools, either because of the schools' teachings or
because of the schools' general policies on student behavior,
modesty, and so on. Just as some secular parents might feel
unable to send their children to a school which teaches a perva-
sively Christian curriculum, so some Christian parents might feel
unable to send their children to a school which teaches a perva-
sively secular curriculum. 3
Many religious groups, especially majority groups, can toler-
ate government-run schools; under the current system, they are
the big winners. A few other religious groups, such as Catholics,
are big enough and prosperous enough that they can set up their
own schools; under the current system, they make do. But
smaller groups whose religious beliefs keep them from using the
government-run schools-including groups that are big enough
that they could set up a school of their own if they could partici-
pate in a school choice program, but are too small or poor to set
it up without such a program-are the losers. Plenty of disparate
impact here.
School choice will lessen this disparate impact, because it
will broaden the choices available to everyone. Today, many
poor parents' only choice is a government-run school (unless
12. The best articulation of this very argument (and several others) is
Alan Brownstein's very fine (though I think ultimately mistaken in certain ways)
Evaluating School Voucher Programs Through a Liberty, Equality, and Free Speech
Matrix, 31 CONN. L. REv. (forthcoming 1999) (manuscript at 31, on file with the
Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy).
13. See, e.g., Nomi Maya Stolzenberg, "He Drew a Circle That Shut Me Out".
Assimilation, Indoctrination, and the Paradox of a Liberal Education, 106 HARv. L.
REv. 581, 585, 591, 595 (1993) (discussing some such objections in Mozert v.
Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987)); see also George W.
Dent, Jr., Of God and Caesar: The Free Exercise Rights of Public School Students, 43
CAst W. RES. L. REV. 707, 708-09 (1993) (discussing other such objections);
George W. Dent, Jr., Religious Children, Secular Schools, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 863,
867-69 (1988) (likewise); Richard F. Duncan, Public Schools and the Inevitability of
Religious Inequality, 1996 B.Y.U. L. REv. 569, 578, 581 (likewise); Rosemary C.
Salomone, Common Schools, Uncommon Values: Listening to the Voices of Dissent, 14
YALE L. & POL'y REv. 169, 181-82, 213 (1996) (likewise); David Bernstein, Why
Johnny Can't Pray, REASON, Feb. 1992, at 56.
1999] 349
350 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 13
they belong to a denomination rich enough to help them).
Under school choice, the poor parents could choose between
government-run schools and many private ones, secular or reli-
gious; given this choice, it's more likely that they'll find at least
one of these schools to be suitable. True, some poor parents will
still be unable to find a school that fits their particular religious
beliefs-but under the current system, many more parents are in
this boat.
3. The Closed Government-Run School Argument
Some hypothesize the following scenario, which also focuses
on supposed disparate impact on minority-religion children: In
a small community, 90% of the students are of one denomina-
tion; school choice leads their parents to pull all of them out of
the government-run school and send.them to a religious school;
the government-run school closes because it lacks enough stu-
dents; and minority-religion students are now forced by circum-
stances to go to the religious school. That, the argument goes,
would be an Establishment Clause violation.
But it seems odd to let the fate of school choice throughout
the whole nation-in many areas of which there is a great diver-
sity of denominations-to be driven by such a rare and easily
remediable hypothetical.1 4 If one is really concerned about this
particular problem, there are plenty of solutions. The school
choice program can, for instance, require that school boards
keep at least one secular school open in every locality. The pro-
gram can even be limited so that at most, say, 80% of the funds
go to private school students, thus requiring that at least 20% of
the money goes to the government-run school (if there's more
demand than that for private schools, the lucky 80% could be
chosen randomly). There are many sound solutions to this prob-
lem, if one thinks it's likely to be a problem; and there's no rea-
son to let the unusual possibility described in the hypothetical
drive the broader debate.
14. I say rare for three reasons: First, many areas of the country are quite
religiously heterogeneous. Second, in the areas that are most religiously
homogeneous, the majority is unlikely to abandon the government-run schools
because it has generally structured them in a way that it likes; the schools are
constitutionally barred from explicitly teaching religion, but they probably
implement a curriculum and disciplinary standards that are largely consistent
with the dominant group's views. Third, recall that government-run schools
now have 89% of the market; it seems quite unlikely that they'll plummet from
89% to 10% simply because of school choice, unless they are very bad indeed.
See supra note 10.
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C. THE DEFENSE OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST RELIGION-SEVEN
OTHER ARGUMENTS
1. The Original Intent Argument
Going beyond arguments that at least use the language of
equality, we turn first to original intent. Wasn't the Establish-
ment Clause intended to prevent any government funds from
flowing, directly or indirectly, to religious institutions, even if
that means discriminating against religion? Wouldn't even-
handed school choice programs set "Thomas Jefferson and
James Madison spinning in their graves,"15 as the president of
People for the American Way opined?
Well, no. Framing-era criticisms of religious establishment
were levied at preferential aid to religion, not at neutral individ-
ual choice programs. For instance,James Madison's Remonstrance
Against Religious Assessments (1786)-often cited by school choice
critics-was actually aimed at a preference scheme called the
"Bill Establishing a Provision for Teachers of the Christian Reli-
gion," which Madison said "violate [d] that equality which ought
to be the basis of every law." 6 The relatively minimal late-1700s
governments gave the Framers no occasion to think about gov-
ernment funds flowing through private choices under genuinely
evenhanded benefit programs to religious institutions.
1 7
If there were evidence that the Framers meant to enshrine
the no-money-flow theory-and thus discrimination against reli-
gion-as a constitutional command, with all the harsh conse-
quences (described in Part A.1) that this would entail, I'm
originalist enough that I would take this evidence seriously. But I
know of no such evidence, and my sense of the Framers'
worldview is that they did not think the government was required
to discriminate against religion.'
15. Statement by People for the American Way President on Milwaukee School
Plan, U.S. NEwswiRE, June 10, 1998, at 1, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library,
USNWR File.
16. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 66 (1948).
17. Compare Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S.
819, 852-63 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that the original
meaning of the Establishment Clause at least allowed evenhanded inclusion of
religious groups in generally available government programs) with id. at 868-71
& nn.1-2 (Souter, J., dissenting) (taking the opposite view). Nor am I aware of
any evidence that the Ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment, by which the
Establishment Clause has been made applicable to the states, intended to
require discrimination against religion.
18. Cf, e.g., Northwest Ordinance of 1787, art. III ("Religion, morality,
and knowledge being necessary to good government and the happiness of
mankind, schools and the means of education shall forever be encouraged.");
see also GERARD V. BRADLEY, CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS IN AMERICA (1987).
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2. The Total Funding Argument
What about the fact that school choice programs make it
possible for virtually all of a religious school's funds to come
from the government? Doesn't such " [t] otal government subsidy
of churches or parochial schools undoubtedly . . . violate the
establishment clause"?19 This, one might argue, distinguishes
school choice programs from the GI Bill, under which only some
of a university's operating budget-even shortlyafter a war, when
many of the students are returning veterans-comes from the
government, and from the charitable tax deduction, under
which only up to 40% or so of the institution's money in effect
flows from the subsidy created by the tax deduction.
This, though, is a distinction without a difference, because it
wrongly focuses on what fraction of an institution's funds indi-
rectly flows from the government, rather than on the important
point, which is how the money flows.
Consider a church or a religious school that is near a mili-
tary base. All or virtually all of its income may well come from
military personnel's salaries, which in turn flow from taxpayer
funds. Would we be concerned that there's a "total government
subsidy of [the] church[ ] or parochial school[ ]"? Would we
insist that the soldiers be barred from paying any donations or
tuition out of their salaries? No: We'd think that any such limita-
tion on the soldiers' choice of what to do with their salaries
would be improper (and perhaps unconstitutional) discrimina-
tion against religious choices, because the choice to use tax-
derived money to "subsid[ize]" religion is the soldier's own
choice, entirely uninfluenced by any governmental preference
for religion.
20
Or imagine that American politics returns to the era of big
spending, and Congress dramatically increases the Pell grant pro-
gram to the point that all college students in the nation can take
advantage of it to cover pretty much their entire tuitions. Does it
suddenly become unconstitutional for these grants to be used at
19. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POUCIES
1005 (1997). Note that many religious schools in fact will not get all or almost
all of their funds from school choice programs. Some such schools may charge
more than the choice funds will cover; some may raise funds from parents or
parishioners to supplement the choice funds; and some school choice
programs may give funds only to some children (for instance, poor ones),
which means that at most schools many children will be privately funded.
20. The same would be equally true of income other than salaries;
consider a church whose parishioners are overwhelmingly poor retirees, who
donate money out of their social security payments.
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Notre Dame or Yeshiva University, simply because Congress
decided to be so generous that all students can now use them?
An implausible example, some might say; the U.S. will never
so completely socialize payment for higher education. But this is
exactly what has happened with K-12 education: K-12 education
is one of the few areas of American life in which the government
has decided to almost entirely socialize the spending for some
activity.
Today, the government-run schools that teach 89% of all K-
12 students21 are "total[ly] subsid[ized]," quite directly, by gov-
ernment funds. Under a school choice program, somewhat more
of the schools (not 100%, since some private schools, including
some religious schools, may charge extra money on top of the
school choice funds) will be almost "total[ly] subsid[ized]" by
government funds routed to the school by parents' choices. This
"total subsidy," though, would simply be an outgrowth of the
laudable goal of funding the teaching of all children, including
those whose parents can't pay for it themselves. So long as the
program treats children alike without regard to the religiosity of
the school to which they go, it's no more "establishment" than
the broadened Pell grant program or the donations by soldiers
would be.
Concern about how much of a program's funding comes
from tax money could only make sense if we were talking about a
minimalist government. If the government didn't subsidize edu-
cation at all, it would indeed be unconstitutional for it to none-
theless fund almost all of the costs of religious education,
because that would be discrimination in favor of religion. But
when the government chooses to play a huge role in some
endeavor-for instance, when, as in the military base example,
the government becomes the dominant local employer, or in the
broadened Pell grant example, the government decides to fund
all college education-then there's nothing improper about the
individual recipients of all this evenhanded government aid vol-
untarily routing some of it to religious uses.
3. The Slippery Slope Argument
But wouldn't the equality theory set us on a slippery slope?
If taken seriously, wouldn't it allow government funding of reli-
gion that's clearly inappropriate? Wouldn't it let the govern-
ment engage even in direct aid to the religious institution itself,
perhaps even funding the building of churches? Or, as one
21. See supra note 10.
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reader of a draft of this paper suggested, wouldn't it allow
"vouchers" that could be donated to a church for "purely reli-
gious rituals"?
The intuitive appeal of this argument, though, rests on the
fact that nowadays the government does not evenhandedly entirely
fund all charitable contributions or the construction of all build-
ings, and that it's hard to imagine the government so broadly
socializing charity or the construction business. But if the gov-
ernment does choose to evenhandedly fund building construc-
tion-for instance, as part of a disaster relief program-then I
see nothing wrong with the government treating all applications
equally, whether or not they come from churches.
To give a real example, following the Oklahoma City Federal
Building bombing, the Federal Emergency Management Agency
at first refused to give generally available rebuilding funds to a
neighboring church that was damaged during the rescue efforts;
FEMA only relented after pressure from Oklahoma's congres-
sional delegation.22 Which approach was more just: FEMA's ini-
tial discrimination against religion, or the equal treatment on
which the government finally settled?2"
Likewise, if the government chose to give all Americans $100
vouchers that they could then donate to a charitable institution
of their choice, I would see no problem with them using this
voucher to fund a religious institution. In fact, this is very close
to what our current tax deduction system does: If I'm in a com-
bined state and federal 45% tax bracket, then if I donate $1000
to a synagogue, even for "purely religious rituals," the govern-
ment will effectively pick up $450 of this tab. Is this unconstitu-
22. Cf Laura Vozzella, Aftermath Gives New Confidence to Oklahomans,
JoURNAL-REc. (Oklahoma City), Apr. 19, 1996 ("The rebuilding effort at First
United Methodist Church has been slowed by church-and-state red tape. The
church, one of at least four damaged in the [Oklahoma City Federal Building]
bombing . . . [sought] $12,000 from the Federal Emergency Management
Agency to cover uninsured damages caused after the blast, when rescuers
placed bloody bodies on the carpeted church floor and pitched tents in its
newly resurfaced parking lot. FEMA refused by saying the aid would violate the
constitutional separation of church and state. The agency later came around
under some pressure from Oklahoma's congressional delegation.").
23." Similarly, contrary to some of the Court's 1970s cases, I see nothing
wrong with the government generally funding buildings at all universities, even
religious ones, so long as the program is equally open to universities without
regard to their religiosity. See, e.g., Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
But even those who disagree with me on this score might accept that programs
in which the money is routed through the free choices of the beneficiaries-
such as my perennial examples of the GI Bill, Pell grants, welfare payments,
government employee salaries, and charitable exemptions-need not
discriminate against religious institutions.
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tional? No, nor would it be unconstitutional if the government
decided to turn the charitable exemption into a straight one-for-
one tax credit.24
Ultimately, it's quite unlikely that American government will
fund all charitable contributions or all building construction.
Our government is big, but it's not that big. One can certainly
oppose such programs on policy grounds, whether or not they
include religious institutions. But if the government shifts to
such a massive subsidy, there seems to me to be nothing wrong in
its including religious institutions, treating them no better and
no worse than anyone else.
4. Quid Pro Quo
Some defend discrimination against religion by finding an
implicit "quid pro quo" in the Religion Clauses: The govern-
ment indeed must discriminate against religion in some ways
under the Establishment Clause, the theory goes, because it must
(or may) favor religion in other ways under the Free Exercise
Clause.25
The trouble with this claim is three-fold. First, the special
benefits that religion supposedly preferentially gets are actually
pretty minor. Tax exemptions, for instance, are neutrally avail-
able to all schools, religious or not; preferential tax exemptions
for religion are generally unconstitutional.26 Religious institu-
tions and individuals may get a few constitutionally assured
exemptions, but-especially following Employment Division v.
Smith,27 though also even before Smith-only a few; and they may
24. Some might even argue that a charitable tax credit is fairer than the
charitable tax exemption, because it at least provides the same effective subsidy
for all taxpayers; the exemption provides a greater effective subsidy for the
favorite charities of those in higher tax brackets.
25. See, e.g., Alan E. Brownstein, Interpreting the Religion Clauses in Terms of
Liberty, Equality, and Free Speech Values, 13 NoTRE DAMEJ.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y
243, 247-48 n.15 (1999); Derek H. Davis, Equal Treatment: A Christian
Separationist Perspective, in EQUAL TREATMENT OF RELIGION IN A PLURALISTIC
SOCIETY 157 (Stephen V. Monsma &J. Christopher Soper eds., 1998).
26. Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989).
27. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). Even before Smith, the Court's Free Exercise
Clause jurisprudence provided very few exemptions for religious objectors. See,
e.g., Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulnerability of
Conscience: The Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religious Conduct, 61 U. CHI. L.
REv. 1245, 1247 (1994) (calling strict scrutiny in pre-Smith Free Exercise Clause
cases "strict in theory but feeble in fact"); Ira C. Lupu, The Trouble with
Accommodation, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 743, 756 (1992) (calling it "strict in
theory, but ever-so-gentle in fact"); Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise
Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 1109, 1110, 1127 (1990)
(saying that "[t]he 'compelling interest' standard is a misnomer" because the
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get a few more preferential statutory exemptions, but even those
are distinctly limited by Texas Monthly v. Bullock and other cases.28
In fact, courts have interpreted some protections for religious
objectors (including, most significantly, Title VII's religious
accommodation provision) to cover all conscientious objectors,
including secular ones, precisely to avoid creating a preference
for religion.29 Can the minor special benefits given to religion
justify massive, multi-billion-dollar discrimination against religion
in school funding?
Second, this comparison highlights a more basic problem
with the "quid pro quo" approach: It provides no guideline for
deciding which kinds of discrimination against religion are
required and which are not. Quid pro quo theorists may argue
that the supposed benefit to religion flowing from the Free Exer-
cise Clause only requires discrimination against religion in K-12
school choice-but if we accept this theory, how can we know
that it won't also require discrimination against religious univer-
sity students in Pell grants and GI Bill funds? How can we know
that it won't require the government to discriminatorily exclude
actual test the Court has applied is more lenient);James E. Ryan, Smith and the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act: An Iconoclastic Assessment, 78 VA. L. REV. 1407,
1413-37 (1992) (examining the "rise and fall of the compelling interest test" in
Free Exercise Clause cases).
28. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 715 (1994); Estate of
Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985).
29. See, e.g., Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970) (Selective Service
Act). As to Title VII, see, for example, Protos v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 797
F.2d 129, 137 n.4 (3rd Cir. 1986) ("The breadth of the 'exemption' afforded by
Title VII is underscored by the fact that in defining religion, the EEOC has used
the same broad definition as the Selective Service employs for conscientious
objector purposes."); Nottelson v. Smith Steel Workers, 643 F.2d 445, 454 n.12
(7th Cir. 1981) (same); Redmond v. GAF Corp., 574 F.2d 897, 901 n.12 (7th
Cir. 1978) ("We believe the proper test to be applied to the determination of
what is 'religious' under § 2000e(j) can be derived from the Supreme Court
decisions in [Welsh] and [Seeger], i.e., (1) is the 'belief' for which protection is
sought 'religious' in person's own scheme of things, and (2) is it 'sincerely
held.'"); Ali v. Southeast Neighborhood House, 519 F. Supp. 489, 490 (D.D.C.
1981) ("Sincere beliefs, meaningful to the believer, need not be confined in
either source or content to traditional or parochial concepts of religion.
[Welsh]. See also [Seeger] for the definition of 'religious training and belief as
applied to a conscientious objector claim, which definition is no less
appropriate here."); Wondzell v. Alaska Wood Prods., Inc., 583 P.2d 860, 866
n.12 (Alaska 1978) ("In order to avoid the danger of unconstitutionality we
would interpret [the state statute] to accord the same privileges to all sincere
conscientious beliefs, whether or not they are accompanied by a belief in a
supreme being."); Kolodziej v. Smith, 425 Mass. 518, 522 (1997). But see
Seshadri v. Kasraian, 130 F.3d 798, 800 (7th Cir. 1997) (Posner, J.) (concluding
that Title VII doesn't apply when "the plaintiff's belief, however deep-seated, is
not religious").
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religious institutions from evenhanded charitable tax exemp-
tions? The "quid pro quo" argument gives us no way of deciding
what amount of discrimination against religion is right and what
amount ends up being too much.
But, third, and most important, "religion" isn't one person
or entity that we can expect to pay for the benefits it gets. Some
groups-for instance, the Amish or Seventh-Day Adventists-
might indeed get some religion-specific benefits in the form of
religious exemptions, but how does that justify discriminating
against other religions (say, Catholics or Southern Baptists) that
get no such religion-specific benefits? Taking "quid" from the
Catholics to compensate for the "quo" given the Amish isn't even
rough justice; it's no justice at all.
5. K-12 Education as Government Speech
Kathleen Sullivan argues that the government must discrimi-
nate against religious schools in school choice programs because
"educational curriculum in K-12"-including the curriculum in
private schools to which government funds flow through an even-
handed school choice program-"is government speech."3"
Because of this, her argument goes, "there is every danger that
the forced inclusion of religious speakers in the mix will cause
the religious message to be attributed to the state and to its tax-
payers"; the government must therefore refrain from including
religious schools in its benefit programs just as it must refrain
from "official endorsement of religion" in its own speech. 1
But this theory rests on a factual premise that just isn't so.
There's no reason to think that reasonable people will indeed
assume the government is endorsing the message of religious
schools: People know that the government doesn't necessarily
endorse private choices that people make with government
funds, any more than it endorses cabbage by letting people use
food stamps to buy the food of their choice, which may include
cabbage.
30. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Parades, Public Squares and Voucher Payments:
Problems of Government Neutrality, 28 CONN. L. REv. 243, 256-57 (1996). At times,
Dean Sullivan's argument sounds like a conventional "no money flow"
argument, for instance when she suggests that "[u]nder a voucher scheme that
extended to parochial school education, some taxpayers would inevitably be
forced to subsidize religious messages with which they did not agree," id. at 256;
her article does not, however, explain why this same argument wouldn't doom
the GI Bill or charitable tax exemptions. Still, her more focused "public
education is government speech" argument is analytically different from the
standard "no money flow" approach.
31. Id. at 256-57.
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The government doesn't endorse Catholicism by helping
GIs go to Notre Dame, or Judaism by letting people deduct con-
tributions to their synagogue (among a wide range of other char-
itable contributions) from their taxes. If you tell a reasonable
person, "Here's a Catholic school, and it teaches Catholic values
and theology; many of its students are here under a school
voucher program, through which parents get funds to send their
kids to any accredited school they wish, whether it's secular, athe-
ist, Jewish, Moslem, or Catholic," I see no reason why such a per-
son would say "Aha! The government must be endorsing
Catholicism," and no likelihood that the person would in fact say
this.3 2 As a descriptive matter, I don't believe that most people
would draw such an inference; and as a normative matter, I don't
see how it can be "reasonable" for a person to draw such an infer-
ence. How can the government be seen as endorsing one view-
point when it evenhandedly lets parents choose schools that fund
a vast range of viewpoints, some of which may be diametrically
opposed to the viewpoint that's supposedly endorsed?
Dean Sullivan tries to support her thesis by pointing out that
the government may not "erect a Latin cross on the capitol roof'
or allow "a private civic group [to] place a cr&che on a court-
house staircase";" this, though, merely reflects the fact that the
government must not give preference to religious messages. Dis-
playing a sectarian symbol this way, or allowing a group special
access to a place where other groups are denied access, would be
such a preference.34
In fact, the government might be allowed to include reli-
gious components even in its own speech, so long as it does so on
a genuinely evenhanded basis: For instance, a government-run
museum should be able to include religiously themed paintings
in its exhibitions, so long as it's choosing those paintings because
of their artistic quality or historical importance, not because of
32. A program that's open only to accredited schools, or only to schools
that (for instance) teach at least reading, writing, and arithmetic, can be said to
endorse reading, writing, arithmetic, or the requirements involved in
accreditation (e.g., success on standardized tests); but it wouldn't endorse
religiosity, which forms no part of the criteria under which schools are
included.
33. Sullivan, supra note 30, at 251, 256.
34. The crche case to which Dean Sullivan seems to be alluding, County
of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989), involved such preferential access. Cf
Capitol Square Rev. & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995) (upholding a
private group's right to erect a cross in a generally open public forum); Lamb's
Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993)
(upholding a private group's right to use school classrooms for after-school
religious speech, when those classrooms were open to other groups).
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their religiosity. But even if I'm wrong on this score, and the
government must keep its own speech free from all religious
components, Dean Sullivan's examples say nothing about genu-
inely evenhanded programs under which the government facili-
tates the speech of others.
6. Government Funds Flowing to Religiously
Discriminatory Programs
Some suggest that government funds may not flow, even
through an evenhanded program, to an institution that discrimi-
nates based on religion in selecting employees. Because the gov-
ernment may not itself discriminate based on religion itself, the
argument goes, government also may not let government money
flow to religiously discriminatory institutions.
This argument, though, is hardly limited to K-12 schools. It
would apply to students using GI Bill funds at religious universi-
ties that consider religion as a factor in hiring their faculty
(something Title VII lets religious universities do35 ). It would
apply to a patient using Medicare at a Catholic hospital that gives
preference to nuns for nurse positions. It would likewise apply to
a government employee donating funds to a church and to a tax-
payer claiming a deduction for such donations. In all these situa-
tions, government money indirectly flows to religious institutions
which "reserv[e] jobs funded by state resources for persons of
their own faith." 6 Is the government really constitutionally obli-
gated to exclude from all these programs all institutions that
(perfectly lawfully) discriminate based on religion in hiring?
The answer to this question must be "no": While the govern-
ment generally ought not discriminate based on religion or religi-
osity, it's quite proper for religious institutions to do this. We're
untroubled by the Catholic University of America preferring
Catholic faculty members, because that's an important way in
which the University ensures that it remains a center for the
35. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1(a), 2000e-2(a); Killinger v. Samford
Univ., 113 F.3d 196 (11th Cir. 1997); Pime v. Loyola Univ. of Chicago, 803 F.2d
351 (7th Cir. 1986).
36. Brownstein, supra note 25, at 283; see also Alan E. Brownstein,
Constitutional Questions About Charitable Choice, in WELFARE REFORM & FArrH-
BASED ORGANIZArIONs 235 (Derek Davis & Barry Hankins eds., 1999) ("Allowing
churches to discriminate on the basis of religion in hiring employees with state
funds impermissibly advances religion because it provides religious
organizations coercive economic power that would otherwise be unavailable to
them were it not for the state's assistance."); Brownstein, supra note 12
(manuscript at 17-18, on file with the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public
Policy) (applying this argument specifically to school choice plans).
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spread of Catholic thinking; if someone is refused a job there
because he's not Catholic, Title VII properly concludes that his
legal rights have not been violated. Likewise for Catholic hospi-
tals preferring nuns as nurses, something that helps the nuns ful-
fill their spiritual calling. And if a veteran or a Pell grant
recipient chooses to use his stipend at Catholic University-per-
haps precisely because he wants to be taught Catholic thinking by
Catholic faculty-the government has no obligation to block that
choice. The same, it seems to me, applies to school choice funds.
7. Harm to Government-Run Schools
Finally, some argue, wouldn't school choice hurt govern-
ment-run schools, for instance by depriving them of money or by
skimming off the best students?
This, though, is a policy objection, not a constitutional one.
The Constitution doesn't have a You May Not Hurt Government-
Run Schools Clause; it has an Establishment Clause.37 Even if
school choice (whether it includes religious schools or is limited
to secular schools) did somehow hurt government-run schools,
this wouldn't make it unconstitutional.
As importantly, we don't really know how school choice will
affect government-run schools. Will it weaken them, or will it
force them to improve by making them compete for students? 8
We will only learn the answer to this question through experi-
mentation. The Establishment Clause question is whether such
experimentation is even permissible; I believe that the answer is
"yes."
But while we are on these policy objections, let me briefly
make two policy responses. First, as to "skimming off the best
students": Even if school choice does lead to the best students
leaving government-run schools (which is far from certain 9 ),
37. State constitutions do sometimes include clauses that guarantee a
public education, but a school choice program doesn't contravene such
mandates: First, school choice does provide students with a publicly funded
education, whether or not the education takes place in government schools;
second, even if the clauses require the government to operate government-run
schools, it hardly follows that they bar the government from supporting both
government-run and privately-run schools.
38. See, e.g., Nina Shokraii Rees, Public School Benefits of Private School
Vouchers, PoL'y REv.,Jan./Feb. 1999, at 16.
39. Private schools take problem students as well as good ones, and often
give the problem students a better education than the students would get at
government-run schools. See, e.g., Jonathan Fox, Sending Public School Students to
Private Schools, POL'Y REv., Jan./Feb. 1999, at 25 (discussing existing programs
through which private schools teach hard-to-educate disabled children); Nina
H. Shokraii, Why Catholic Schools Spell Success for America's Inner-City Children,
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and thus "hurting" the schools, the "skimming" objection gets
the analysis exactly backward. Students shouldn't be means to
the end of improving the government schools-government
schools should be a means to the end of improving each student.
Good students aren'tjust tools that are available for the gov-
ernment to use in order to improve the quality of its schools (or
even to improve the education of other, not-so-good students).
It's wrong to deprive the good students of educational choices so
they can remain trapped in government schools for the govern-
ment schools' benefit. Even if there are good arguments for not
helping parents who choose to send their kids to private schools,
"we need your kid at the government school to make the school
better" is not among them.
Note also that the "skimming" objection could equally well
be made against government-run magnet schools, charter
schools, and all the other programs that many school choice
opponents have proposed as alternatives to school choice. Of
course, the objection there is unsound: There's nothing wrong
with a magnet school providing a better education for the good
students, even if that means that other schools will be somehow
deprived of those students. But exactly the same point applies to
private schools.4"
Second, as to school choice supposedly draining money
from the government-run schools: Again, this may not in fact
HERITAGE FOUND. ROE BACKGROUNDER No. 1128, June 30, 1997, available at
(visited Apr. 18, 1999) <http://www.heritage.org/library/categories/
education/bg1128.html>. Moreover, some school choice plans provide for
random selection (though I don't believe such a criterion is constitutionally
required).
40. For a remarkable example of this, see Dave McNeely, Vouchers Won't
Solve Problems in Education, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, July 23, 1996, at A7. The
article sets forth (seemingly with approval) the argument that
[V]ouchers that use tax dollars to allow students to pay tuition at
private schools in essence allow the private schools to skim the cream
off the public school system.
As the haves and the best and brightest have-nots exit the public
school system, those left behind do not have nearly as much
opportunity to be exposed to the smarter kids. And since students
learn almost as much from each other as they do from their teachers,
this is unfair.
Id. This is the classic trap-the-good-students-to-help-the-bad-ones argument.
But then the article describes, again favorably, the argument that "a far
better way to bring competition and market forces to work in public education
is charter schools, not vouchers." Id. Nowhere does the article acknowledge
that charter schools are subject to the same "skimming" critique that the article
saw as such a strong argument against broad school choice.
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happen,4" but even if it does, where did the government-run
schools get this extra money that school choice would supposedly
drain?
Under our educational system, all children are entitled to
have their educations paid for; the government commits on aver-
age $6000/year to this end.4 2 Without school choice, when par-
ents send a child to private school they forfeit this money, which
means they must have found the government schools so unsatis-
factory that they are willing to entirely throw away the subsidy.
Each time a child leaves the government school system, the state
treasury receives a windfall, because it has one less child to edu-
cate (while still having the same tax revenues coming in).
The supposed "loss" to the government-run schools comes
out of this massive windfall. Under school choice, parents who
leave the government schools would no longer have to entirely
surrender the education funds that their child would otherwise
have gotten; part of the funds would travel with the child to the
school the parents choose. True, the treasury would no longer
be able to make money off the parents' dissatisfaction with the
government schools, so in that sense the public fisc (and the
schools funded out of it) would be "hurt" by school choice. But
this "harm" would just be an outcome of the fact that private
school parents would no longer have to pay twice-once for the
government-run education that they found unsatisfactory and
once for the privately run education they are buying in its stead.
41. Many school choice programs provide lower support for choice
students than the cost of the education at government schools; therefore,
students who leave government schools under those programs will actually save
the government money, while students who had left government schools earlier
but who now get choice funds will cost the government money. For instance, if
the cost of government school education is $6000/year, the choice program
pays $4000/year, 10% of all students were in private school before the choice
program, and 30% of all students will be in private school after the choice
program is implemented, the government will lose no money (since $6000 X
90% = $6000 x 70% + $4000 x 30%). Likewise, if a school choice program has
$5000/year choice payments but is open only to poor students, only 3% of all
poor students were in private school before the choice program is
implemented, and 20% of all poor students will be in private school after the
choice program is implemented, the government will save money (since $6000
x 97% > $6000 x 80% + $5000 x 20%). Of course, some other school choice
programs-for instance, ones that pay for a voucher that is equal to the cost of
the government school education-will end up costing extra money for the
government; I only point out that if revenue-neutrality were the only concern,
many school choice programs, especially ones aimed at poor kids, could pass
muster.
42. See NATIONAL CTR. FOR EDUC. STATS., supra note 10, at tbl. 169,
available at (visited Apr. 18, 1999) <http://nces.ed.gov/pubs/digest97/
d97t169.html> (current expenditure per enrolled pupil, 1996-97, estimated).
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Surely eliminating this double payment would create a fairer sys-
tem, even if the system would be somewhat more expensive
because it gives away some of the old system's unearned windfall.
Finally, consider a hypothetical: Let's imagine that the
defenders of government schools speak so eloquently that all pri-
vate school parents see the light and immediately transfer their
children back to the government-run system. This would impose
a greater burden on the public treasury than a school choice pro-
gram would impose (since school choice programs usually spend
less on private school students than is spent on students in gov-
ernment-run schools).
Does this extra burden mean that the parents are somehow
greedy people who would be "harming the government schools"
by their actions, and who should therefore be discouraged from
returning to the government schools? No: Parents who switch
back to a government school are simply reclaiming the benefit
that the government has promised to provide for their children.
The same is true for school choice programs, which simply give
back to the parents who had fled the government system the ben-
efit that they originally had.
D. HARM TO RELIGION
Finally, I turn to an argument that focuses not on alleged
harm to taxpayers or to religious minorities, but rather on poten-
tial harm to religious institutions themselves: The argument that
school choice is unconstitutional because it might hurt religious
schools by bringing government oversight and regulation and
thus destroying religious schools' independence. True, the argu-
ment runs, schools could just avoid the strings by rejecting the
money; but when put to the choice of (1) taking the government
subsidy and compromising their religious objections to the
strings or (2) sticking by their beliefs but losing the subsidy, they
may feel pressure to choose option two. And the possibility of
such pressure, the argument goes, isn't just a policy argument
against school choice, but actually makes school choice violate
the Establishment Clause.
To begin with, though, note that this argument too is
equally applicable to all neutral programs, notjust ones involving
K-12 schools. If you take it seriously, you'd have to say that the GI
Bill and the charitable tax deduction are also unconstitutional,
because they could also come with strings that pressure recipi-
ents to compromise their religious beliefs.4" Exhibit A here
43. The benefits that universities get from the charitable tax exemption
are valuable enough that the threat of withdrawing the exemption can cause
1999]
364 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 13
would be Bob Jones University v. United States,44 in which the gov-
ernment successfully pressured Goldsboro Christian Schools into
abandoning its religiously motivated racially discriminatory
admissions policy.45
But more importantly, this focus on the pressure caused by
school choice programs blithely ignores the greater pressure
exerted by the status quo. After all, just as religious schools
might conceivably object on religious grounds to some strings
that come with school choice funds, so today many religious par-
ents object on religious grounds to many aspects of the curricu-
lum and environment in government-run public schools. The
offer of a free education in a government-run school puts these
parents to the choice of (1) taking this government subsidy and
compromising their religious objections to the curriculum or
environment or (2) sticking by their beliefs but losing the sub-
sidy-and of course many of these parents feel pressure to
choose option two.
So again the supposed constitutional defect-here, the risk
of government pressure that leads some to abandon their reli-
gious obligations-is as present under the existing system as
under a school choice system. In fact, it may be greater under
the existing system. School choice programs might come with a
few strings, but a school choice system at least can take a mostly
hands-off approach to the conduct of each private school, just as
the tax deduction system attaches some strings to the charitable
deduction, but not many. But the government obviously can't
take such an approach to the conduct of government-run
schools, and thus government-run schools necessarily impose a
vast range of "strings" on their students: You must take classes
that teach you this-and-such, and are structured in the following
way; you must be around students who dress in ways you might
think immodest (and thus spiritually harmful for you to look at),
or use language you might think is blasphemous (and thus spiri-
tually harmful for you to hear); and so on. This is inevitable for
tremendous pressure; the GI Bill benefits may be somewhat less, but they could
still be plenty, especially immediately following a major war.
44. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 581 (1983).
45. Ralph Mawdsley, Religious Educational Institutions: Limitations and
Liabilities UnderADEA and Title VII, 89 ED. L. REP. 19, 34 n.92 (1994). The other
school involved in this litigation, Bob Jones University, apparently resisted the
pressure, id., but it may have earlier changed another of its policies-a ban on
admission of unmarried blacks, which it believed was scripturally required-in
response to an earlier threat of revocation of its tax exemption. See Bob Jones
Univ., 461 U.S. at 581; Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term: Foreword:
Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARv. L. REv. 4, 51 & n.139 (1983).
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any school that the government itself not only indirectly funds,
but directly runs.
Government-imposed conditions that pressure people to
compromise their religious beliefs should thus be less serious
under a school choice system than they are today. At the very
least, they would be no more serious.
E. THE CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE OF EQUAL TREATMENT
If these arguments are correct, then equal treatment is at
least constitutionally allowed. But I also believe, equal treatment
is constitutionally compelled: The government may not discrimi-
nate against people or institutions because of their religiosity.
The government may choose to fund only government-run
schools and not private ones, because such a distinction would be
based on government control, not religiosity; but any choice pro-
grams that help secular private schools may not exclude religious
ones.
To begin with, this view is supported by the Free Exercise
Clause, under which, Employment Division v. Smith tells us, "The
government may not ... impose special disabilities on the basis
of religious views or religious status."" "At a minimum, the pro-
tections of the Free Exercise Clause pertain if the law at issue
discriminates against some or all religious beliefs or regulates or
prohibits conduct because it is undertaken for religious
reasons."47
The Court has usually said this when discussing prohibitions
on conduct, but equality rules generally apply to government
benefits as well as government prohibitions." In fact, even in
McDaniel v. Paty, where the Court dealt not with a ban on reli-
gious conduct but rather with eligibility for office, the Brennan/
Marshall concurrence held that excluding ministers from office
violated the Free Exercise Clause, because "government may not
use religion as a basis of classification for the imposition of
duties, penalties, privileges or benefits.""9
Likewise, the Court's Free Speech Clause cases suggest the
government may not discriminate against private religious teach-
ing and in favor of private secular teaching, even when the dis-
46. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990).
47. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S.
520, 532 (1993).
48. Consider, for instance, the Equal Protection Clause principles of
equal treatment based on race and sex.
49. McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 639 (1978) (Brennan, J., joined by
Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment).
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crimination involves distribution of benefits. Widmar v. Vincent
held that the government may not deny college classrooms to
religious meetings when it opens them to secular meetings.50
Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District held the
same as to K-12 classrooms.51 Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of
the University of Virginia held the same as to reimbursement of
expenses for college newspapers.
5 2
Religious speech is not some stepchild of constitutional law:
It is fully protected by the Free Speech Clause, and once the gov-
ernment sets up a generally open subsidy program, it can't dis-
criminate against religious speech in operating the program.
And education is, of course, predominantly speech. Just as the
Free Speech Clause would stop the government from banning
religious schools,5" so it prohibits a government that's willing to
50. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
51. 508 U.S. 384 (1993).
52. 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
53. Such an action may also violate parents' substantive due process
rights, see Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390 (1923), but surely it would violate the Free Speech Clause, too: As
the Court has noted, the Pierce and Meyer holdings overlap in considerable
measure with First Amendment protections. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep.
Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969):
It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the
schoolhouse gate. This has been the unmistakable holding of this
Court for almost 50 years. In [Meyer v. Nebraska and a companion
case], this Court, in opinions by Mr. Justice McReynolds, held that the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prevents States
from forbidding the teaching of a foreign language to young students.
Statutes to this effect, the Court held, unconstitutionally interfere with
the liberty of teacher, student, and parent. See Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, etc., 268 U.S. 510 (1925) [followed by a string cite of several
Free Speech Clause cases and two Establishment Clause cases].
See also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482-83 (1965) (citations
omitted):
The right to educate a child in a school of the parents' choice-
whether public or private or parochial [and] ... the right to study any
particular subject or any foreign language ... [have] been construed
to [be] include[d in the First Amendment] .... By Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, the right to educate one's children as one chooses is made
applicable to the States by the force of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments. By Meyer v. State of Nebraska, the same dignity is given
the right to study the German language in a private school. In other
words, the State may not, consistently with the spirit of the First
Amendment, contract the spectrum of available knowledge. The right
of freedom of speech and press includes not only the right to utter or
to print, but the right to distribute, the right to receive, the right to
read and freedom of inquiry, freedom of thought, and freedom to
teach-indeed the freedom of the entire university community. With-
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fund all other accredited secular schools from discriminating
against religious schools because of the religiosity of the view-
points they teach.
Even the Court's Establishment Clause cases suggest that the
government may no more discriminate against religion than dis-
criminate in its favor. Under all its leading Establishment Clause
tests,54 the Court has used the language of evenhandedness.
Under the Lemon test, the government may not do things that
have the primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion.
55
out those peripheral rights the specific rights would be less secure.
And so we reaffirm the principle of the Pierce and the Meyer cases.
54. Except the coercion test, which has been used in only one majority
decision, Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
55. "Neutrality is what is required. The State must confine itself to
secular objectives, and neither advance nor impede religious activity." Roemer
v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 747 (1976) (plurality). "The
Establishment Clause, properly understood, is a shield against any attempt by
government to inhibit religion as it has doie here [in disqualifying ministers
from office]." McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 641 (1978) (Brennan, J., joined
by Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment). "[A] generally applicable tax has
a secular purpose and neither advances nor inhibits religion [thus not violating
the Establishment Clause], for the very essence of such a tax is that it is neutral
and nondiscriminatory on questions of religious belief." Jimmy Swaggart
Ministries v. Board of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378, 394 (1990). See also Texas
Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 9 (1989) (Brennan, J., for the plurality)
(stating that the principle "that government may not be overtly hostile to
religion" is part of "the requirement that ... [a statute's] principal or primary
effect ... be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion").
For other cases repeating the symmetrical requirement of no advancement
and no inhibition, see Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997, 2015 (1997) (finding
no "'excessive entanglement' that advances or inhibits religion"); Lamb's
Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 395 (1993)
("[tihe challenged governmental action . . .does not have the principal or
primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion"); County of Allegheny v.
ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 592 (1989) ("to be permissible under the Establishment
Clause.... [a statute or practice] must neither advance nor inhibit religion in
its principal or primary effect"); Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 696
(1989) ("the primary effect of [the law] is neither to advance nor inhibit
religion"); Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 336
(1987) (holding that the law has "a principal or primary effect.. . that neither
advances nor inhibits religion"); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 583 (1987)
("the statute's principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances
nor inhibits religion"); id. at 617 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("a State which discovers
that its employees are inhibiting religion must take steps to prevent them from
doing so"); School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 383 (1985) ("[we] go on to
consider whether the primary or principal effect of the challenged programs is
to advance or inhibit religion"); Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 422 (1985)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("a statute must have . .. a principal or primary
effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion"); Estate of Thornton v.
Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 708 (1985) ("[a statute's] primary effect must not
advance or inhibit religion"); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 68 (1985)
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Under the endorsement test, the government may not express
endorsement or disapproval of religion. 6 In its earlier cases, the
("statutes must have.. . a principal or primary effect that neither advances nor
inhibits religion"); Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U.S.
290, 305 n.30 (1985) ("the criteria to be used in determining whether a statute
violates the Establishment Clause are [among other things] . . .whether its
primary effect is one that neither advances nor inhibits religion"); Lynch v.
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 679 (1984) ("we have often found it useful to
inquire . . .whether [a government action's] principal or primary effect is to
advance or inhibit religion"); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 394 (1983) (a
statute's "principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor
inhibits religion"); Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 123 (1982) ("the
statute['s] ... principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor
inhibits religion"); Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 235 n.8 (1982) (the "second
test [under the standard Establishment Clause inquiry] requires that the
'principal or primary effect' of the challenged statute 'be one that neither
advances nor inhibits religion'"); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 271 (1981)
("a policy will not offend the Establishment Clause if it can pass a three-
pronged test," one prong being that the policy's "principal or primary effect
must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion"); Stone v. Graham, 449
U.S. 39, 40 (1980) (same); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 319 (1980) (same);
Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 653
(1980) ("a legislative enactment does not contravene the Establishment Clause
if [among other things] ... its principal or primary effect neither advances nor
inhibits religion"); McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 636, n.9 (1978) (Brennan,J.,
joined by Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment) ("under the Religion
Clauses government is generally prohibited from seeking to advance or inhibit
religion"); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 236 (1977) (to pass Establishment
Clause scrutiny, a law "must have a principal or primary effect that neither
advances nor inhibits religion"); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 358 (1975)
(same); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 744 (1973) ("we are satisfied that
implementation of the proposal will not have the primary effect of advancing or
inhibiting religion"); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist,
413 U.S. 756, 788 (1973) ("our cases require the State to maintain an attitude of
'neutrality,' neither 'advancing' nor 'inhibiting' religion"); Tilton v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 678 (1971) ("we consider... [whether] the primary
effect of the Act [is] to advance or inhibit religion"); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403
U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (holding that one of the Establishment Clause tests is that
"a law's principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor
inhibits religion"); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 107 (1968) ("If either
[the purpose or the primary effect of an enactment] is the advancement or
inhibition of religion then the enactment exceeds the scope of legislative power
as circumscribed by the Constitution"); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236,
243 (1968) ("to withstand the strictures of the Establishment Clause there must
be a secular legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor
inhibits religion"); School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963) (same).
56. Capitol Square Rev. & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 778
(1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) ("[e]very government
practice must be judged . . . to determine whether it constitutes an
endorsement or disapproval of religion"); Board of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S.
687, 720 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) ("[c]ases involving government speech on religious topics . . .
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Court stressed that the government ought not show favoritism or
hostility to religion.5 7 These statements have largely been dicta,
but the Court has repeated them so often that we must assume
that it meant them (unless we conclude that it was just mouthing
the language of evenhandedness to better sell its unpopular
holdings). And if giving special benefits to religion is favoritism,
require an analysis focusing on whether the speech endorses or disapproves of
religion"); Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 249 (1990) ("[b] ecause the
Act on its face grants equal access to both secular and religious speech, we think
it clear that the Act's purpose was not to 'endorse or disapprove of religion'");
County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 620 (1989) ("it is not 'sufficiently
likely' that residents of Pittsburgh will perceive the combined display of the
tree, the sign, and the menorah as an 'endorsement' or 'disapproval... of their
individual religious choices"'); id. at 625 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) ("[t]he government violates [the Establishment
Clause] if it endorses or disapproves of religion"); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482
U.S. 578, 585 (1987) ("[t]he purpose prong of the Lemon test asks whether
government's actual purpose is to endorse or disapprove of religion"); School
Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 389 (1985) ("[if] . . . identification [of the
government with religion] conveys a message of government endorsement or
disapproval of religion, a core purpose of the Establishment Clause is
violated"); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56 (1984) ("[i]n applying the
purpose test, it is appropriate to ask 'whether government's actual purpose is to
endorse or disapprove of religion"'); id. at 74 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the
judgment) (discussing how the Court should determine "whether the
government intends a moment of silence statute to convey a message of
endorsement or disapproval of religion"); id. at 69 ("the Establishment Clause
is infringed when the government makes adherence to religion relevant to a
person's standing in the political community"); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S.
668, 668 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[t]he second and more direct
infringement [of the Establishment Clause] is government endorsement or
disapproval of religion").
57. "State power is no more to be used so as to handicap religions, than it
is to favor them." Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947) (Black, J.,
for the majority); McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 636 (1978) (Brennan, J.,
joined by Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment). "The First Amendment
mandates governmental neutrality between religion and religion, and between
religion and nonreligion." Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968).
"[T]he State may not... affirmatively oppos[e] or show[ ] hostility to religion,
thus 'preferring those who believe in no religion over those who believe.'"
School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963). "The First Amendment
leaves the Government in a position not of hostility but of neutrality." Engel v.
Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 443 (1962) (Douglas, J., concurring). See also cases cited
infra note 59; Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 9 (1989) (Brennan,J.,
for the plurality) (concluding that part of the Establishment Clause's
requirements is "that government may not be overtly hostile to religion");
Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 554 (1986) (Burger,
C.J., dissenting) ("[t]he Establishment Clause mandates state neutrality, not
hostility, toward religion"); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 85 (1985) (Burger,
C.J., dissenting) ("[f]or decades our opinions have stated that hostility toward
any religion or toward all religions is as much forbidden by the Constitution as
is an official establishment of religion").
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advancement, and endorsement, then discriminating against reli-
gion is hostility, inhibition, and disapproval.58
Finally, the Court has often said that religious discrimination
violates the Equal Protection Clause;59 though it has generally
said this about discrimination among religious sects, this princi-
ple should at least presumptively apply to discrimination between
religious and nonreligious people and institutions. Whether a
person, a message, or a curriculum is religious should be as irrel-
evant to a secular government as is the particular flavor of reli-
gion to which the person, message, or curriculum adheres.6 ° (I
58. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819,
845-46 (1995) (discriminating against religious speakers "would risk fostering a
pervasive bias or hostility to religion, which could undermine the very neutrality
the Establishment Clause requires"); Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226,
248 (1990) ("if a State refused to let religious groups use facilities open to
others, then it would demonstrate not neutrality but hostility toward religion");
Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 708 (1986) (plurality) ("refusal to extend [a
generally available] exemption to an instance of religious hardship suggests a
discriminatory intent ... [and thus] tends to exhibit hostility, not neutrality,
towards religion"); Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 420 (1985) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) (concluding that excluding religious schools from the generally
applicable program at issue in the case "[r]ather than showing the neutrality
the Court boasts of, . . . exhibits nothing less than hostility toward religion");
McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 636 (1978) (Brennan, J.,joined by Marshall, J.,
concurring in the judgment) ("the exclusion [of ministers from the legislature]
manifests patent hostility toward, not neutrality respecting, religion").
It will not do to argue that discriminating against religion in funding isn't
hostility or inhibition because it merely denies religion a benefit and thus leaves
it alone-discriminatory denial of a benefit that is available to everyone else is
indeed hostility and inhibition. Compare Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S.
1 (1989), where the Court (per Justice Brennan's plurality opinion) struck
down a religion-favoring tax exemption: Though it might be argued that a tax
exemption isn't advancement or favoritism, but merely leaving religion alone,
the better view-and the view the Court took in Texas Monthly-is that
discriminatory exemption from taxes is a form of advancement. By the same
logic, discriminatory exemption from a general subsidy program is a form of
inhibition.
59. See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996); Board
of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 715 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment); Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Ford, 504 U.S. 648,
650 (1992); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 272 (1951); American Sugar
Ref. Co. v. Louisiana, 179 U.S. 89, 92 (1900); see also State v. Madison, 240 Md.
265, 274, 213 A.2d 880, 885 (1965);Juarez v. State, 102 Tex. Crim. 297, 304, 277
S.W. 1091, 1094 (1925). These statements have generally been made in dictum
(though in Niemotko, Madison, and Juarez they were holdings), perhaps because
overt government discrimination based on religion has fortunately been
relatively rare in recent times; still, I've heard no one deny that this dictum is
quite right.
60. Even Erwin Chemerinsky, who believes that school choice programs
violate the Establishment Clause, concludes that some forms of discrimination
against religious institutions would violate the Equal Protection Clause: "[It]
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disagree with the Court's statement in Corporation of Presiding
Bishop v. Amos that such discrimination should only be subject to
Establishment Clause scrutiny and not Equal Protection Clause
scrutiny,1 though I think the ultimate result in Amos may be jus-
tifiable on other grounds.)
There are certainly strains in the Court's jurisprudence-
including the holding in Sloan v. Lemon (1973) 62-that work
against this argument, just as the strains I identify work in its
favor. Moreover, it may be hard to imagine the Court jumping
from the current regime, in which it isn't clear whether equal
treatment of religion is even allowed, to one in which such equal
treatment is required.
63
But I think the core understanding of the clauses, as it has
evolved through the totality of the Court's jurisprudence, sup-
ports my view. The Free Exercise Clause is generally and prop-
erly understood as barring discrimination against religion. The
Free Speech Clause is generally and properly understood as bar-
ring discrimination against religious speech, a constraint that fits
well into the general principle that free speech means no govern-
ment discrimination based on viewpoint (or often even content).
The Equal Protection Clause asserts that certain traits, including
religion and, I believe, religiosity, should not be bases for govern-
mental classifications. And the Establishment Clause, as I argue
above, supports, and at the very least does not oppose, this
would be clearly unconstitutional if the government provided no public
services-no police or fire protection, no sanitation services-to religious
institutions. Such discrimination surely would violate equal protection and
infringe free exercise of religion." CHEMERMNSKY, supra note 19, at 1005.
61. 483 U.S. 327, 339 (1987).
62. 413 U.S. 825, 834 (1973) (holding that excluding religious schools
from generally available school choice program is required by the
Establishment Clause and isn't barred by the Equal Protection Clause). But see
Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 390 n.4
(1993) (concluding that the Court need not reach the question whether the
exclusion of religious views from a generally applicable benefit "violated the
Establishment Clause because it . .. demonstrate[d] hostility to religion").
63. It's tempting to suggest that the Constitution "does not require what
it barely permits," to borrow a phrase from Coalition for Economic Equity v. Wilson,
122 F.3d 692, 709 (9th Cir. 1997), which held that a state may constitutionally
ban race preferences; but this is a false analogy. The Constitution "barely
permits" race preferences in the sense that race preferences are presumptively
suspect; thus, even if the government may at times implement them, it certainly
has no obligation to do so. But if the view expressed in Part A is correct, then
the Constitution doesn't "barely permit" equal treatment of religion-such
equal treatment isn't presumptively suspect, because the Establishment Clause
concerns itself only with preferential treatment. There is therefore nothing
odd about the Constitution not just permitting, but requiring,
nondiscrimination based on religiosity.
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understanding: Its core meaning is no special benefit for reli-
gion-"establishing" something must necessarily mean treating it
better than its rivals.
In fact, since 1995 three circuit courts of appeal have in
some measure adopted an analysis much like this one, holding
(at least in some government subsidy contexts) that the govern-
ment may not discriminate against religious institutions. Colum-
bia Union College v. Clarke held that excluding religious
educational institutions from a generally available funding pro-
gram presumptively violates the Free Speech Clause and possibly
the Free Exercise and Equal Protection Clauses.' The court
held that the presumption was rebutted because including reli-
gious institutions in the particular program-a program that
directly funded colleges, rather than a choice program that sup-
ported the decisions of students-would have violated the Estab-
lishment Clause; but the court made clear that had inclusion of
the religious schools been permissible under the Establishment
Clause (as I argue inclusion of religious schools in school choice
programs would be), it would have been mandatory under the
Free Speech Clause.
Likewise, Peter v. Wedl held that excluding religious schools
from participation in a generally available Individuals with Disa-
bilities Education Act program "explicitly discriminated against
children who attended private religious schools," and that such
"[g] overnment discrimination based on religion violates the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, the Free Speech Clause
of the First Amendment, and the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment."6" Finally, Hartmann v. Stone struck
down an Army regulation that excluded child care providers who
"teach or promote religious doctrine" from a general program
that let child care providers use government-owned housing on
military bases. Such an exclusion, the court concluded, violated
the Free Exercise Clause because it singled out religious practices
for exclusion.66
64. 159 F.3d 151, 155-57 & n.1 (4th Cir. 1998).
65. 155 F.3d 992, 996 (8th Cir. 1998).
66. 68 F.3d 973, 977-79 (6th Cir. 1995). But see Bronx Household of Faith
v. Community Sch. Dist. No. 10, 127 F.3d 207 (2d. Cir. 1997) (concluding that
excluding religious organizations from an otherwise open nonpublic forum
didn't violate the Free Speech Clause, the Free Exercise Clause, the
Establishment Clause, and the Equal Protection Clause); Bagley v. Raymond
Sch. Dep't, No. CUM-98-281, 1999 WL 236464 (Me. Apr. 23, 1999) (concluding
that excluding religious schools from general school choice program doesn't
implicate the Free Exercise, Establishment, and Free Speech Clauses, and
concluding that while the exclusion triggers strict scrutiny under the Equal
Protection Clause, the scrutiny is satisfied because the Establishment Clause
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But in any event, even if these courts are mistaken about the
constitutional mandate of equality, surely the Constitution at
least allows such equality. Religious people or institutions ought
not be treated better than secular people or institutions. But
nothing in the Constitution requires that they be treated worse.
requires such an exclusion); Witters v. State Comm'n for the Blind, 112 Wash.
2d 363, 372, 771 P.2d 1119, 1123 (1989) (seemingly acknowledging that
discrimination against religious institutions requires strict scrutiny under the
Equal Protection Clause, but concluding that the state has a compelling interest
"in ensuring the separation of church and state, as required by the Constitution
of the State of Washington").
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